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Abstract We report a study of a stylized banking cascade model investigat-
ing systemic risk caused by counter party failure using liabilities and assets
to define banks’ balance sheet. In our stylized system, banks can be in two
states: normally operating or distressed and the state of a bank changes from
normally operating to distressed whenever its liabilities are larger than the
banks’ assets. The banks are connected through an interbank lending net-
work and, whenever a bank is distressed, its creditor cannot expect the loan
from the distressed bank to be repaid, potentially becoming distressed them-
selves. We solve the problem analytically for a homogeneous system and
test the robustness and generality of the results with simulations of more
complex systems. We investigate the parameter space and the correspond-
ing distribution of operating banks mapping the conditions under which the
whole system is stable or unstable. This allows us to determine how financial
stability of a banking system is influenced by regulatory decisions, such as
leverage; we discuss the effect of central bank actions, such as quantitative
easing and we determine the cost of rescuing a distressed banking system
using re-capitalisation. Finally, we estimate the stability of the UK and US
banking systems in the years 2007 and 2012 showing that both banking sys-
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2tems were more unstable in 2007 and connectedness on the interbank market
partly caused the banking crisis.
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1 Introduction
During the global financial crisis that started around 2008, it became evident
that the structure of the modern financial system can cause sever danger in
the event of distress of single banks by spreading the distress through claims
on the interbank market to other banks. The risk that banks impose on
others through interconnectedness is called counter party risk [48] and it is
the subject of this paper.
In this study, we are reporting how interconnectedness via the interbank
market and the ratios between liabilities and assets influence the stability of
a stylized banking system. The risk of banks to cause system failure is called
systemic risk [23]. Extending a simple Merton model of default [42], we are
able to test the systemic resilience of the financial system based on balance
sheet quantities and determine ratios at which counter party risk can cause
the entire system to fail.
There is a rich literature on stylized banking models. For instance, in [10,
28, 40, 43] counter party risk exposed via interbank lending is investigated.
Other studies by [15, 46, 47], considered default cascade from an initial shock
on asset prices and study market risk of correlated asset classes. These models
have been used to investigate avalanches, loss distributions and parameter
influences on the stability of the system. Most of the models are simulation
based, and use as an initial shock an arbitrary failure of a portion of banks,
or arbitrary loss on the value of assets.
In this paper, we propose a model combing the balance sheet based model,
used by [28] and [43], with the contagion model used by [46] creating a
stylized banking system that is analogous to the random field Ising model,
a well-known model in the statistical physics literature. The application of
this kind of model in the context of economic and financial behaviour has
been reviewed in [13], and its application to credit default models has been
discussed in [34].
In our stylized banking system, a bank is considered insolvent, if its li-
abilities are larger than the bank’s assets, the so-called balance sheet test
[30]. Such insolvency of a bank can be triggered by a random event (such
as changes in the value of the assets). The interconnectedness between in-
stitutions, in form of loans from one institution to another, can propagate
this insolvency from a bank to another creating further insolvencies, bringing
down -eventually- the entire system. In this paper, we discuss a solution of
this model, obtained by homogenizing the system. This allows for a mean-
field assumption enabling us to compute the equilibrium fraction of surviving
banks given changes in the values of the balance sheet quantities. Further,
we test our results changing the structure of the exposure network testing
3robustness and generality of the mean-field solution. We detail the parame-
ter ranges that lead to a stable or unstable system, allowing us to determine
restricting ratios between liabilities and assets to ensure a stable banking sys-
tem. Further, we quantify the costs of potential rescue attempts to re-direct
an unstable system into a stable region. We find that interbank lending can
increase the stability of a banking system but this at the price of an increas-
ing risk of a sudden systemic failure with inflating recovery cost. Finally,
we show using balance sheet data for 2007 and 2012 that the US and UK
banking system in 2007 was more prone to failure than in 2012.
The structure of the paper is as follows: In Section 2, we describe the
setup of the contagion model. This is followed by Section 3, where we state
our assumptions and define an iteration function that describes the contagion
process. In Section 4, we discuss the results and implications of the model.
In particular, Section 4.4 addresses the stability of the system and discusses
the implication for central banks and regulators to influence the quantities of
a balance sheet to create, or return, to a stable system. Section 5 compares
the mean-field results with the equilibrium values of simulation testing the
robustness of the model for different random distributions for the balance
sheet quantities, determining the effects of different structures for the expo-
sure network and collateralized lending. In Section 6, data of US and UK
banks’ balance sheets are used to determine the stability of the US and UK
banking system in 2007 and 2012. Conclusions and perspectives are given in
Section 7.
2 Stress Model
In our model, we consider M banks. To investigate the default process, we
restrict our interest to the short term propagation of stress on the banking
system. Specifically, we look at short lapses of time when banks just become
unable to operate but still are not necessary defaulted, i.e. the point in time
at which, according to the Banking Act 2009 in British law, a decision about
the future of an unstable bank has to be made. Thus, we distinguish between
normally operating banks and distressed banks, such that the state of a bank
is given by:
Si(t) =
{
1 if bank i is operating normally
0 if bank i is distressed
. (1)
We adopt the stylized balance sheet introduced by [28] and [43], also
considering liabilities and assets. A schematic diagram of a simple balance
sheet of a bank ‘i’ is given in Figure 1.
The non-interbank assets of a bank i at time t are gi(t). The exposure
matrix {Jki(t)}0≤k,i≤M describes the interbank lending network at time t;
interbank lending is modelled by adding all the debt of banks k at time t to a
bank i, and multiplying this with the state of banks k, i.e.
∑
k∈νi Jki(t)Sk(t),
where νi is the set of borrowers to bank i. The state of a bank k indicates
whether bank k is able to pay back the loan. Then, the total assets of bank
i at time t are
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Fig. 1 Stylised balance sheet of bank i. The total liabilities of bank i at time t,
Li(t), is the sum of the bank’s deposits, di(t), and interbank borrowing,
∑
k∈γi Jik.
The total assets of bank i at time t, Ai(t), is the sum of non-interbank assets, gi(t),
and interbank lending,
∑
k∈νi Jki(t)Sk(t). The difference in the bank’s total assets
and liabilities is the bank’s capital Ei(t) = Ai(t)−Li(t). A bank is said to operate
normally if Ai(t) ≥ Li(t). If Ai(t) < Li(t) the bank is said to be in distress.
Ai(t) = gi(t) +
∑
k∈νi
Jki(t)Sk(t). (2)
The customer deposits of bank i at time t is denoted by di(t). Interbank
borrowing at time t is
∑
k∈γi Jik, where γi is the set of loaners to bank i
and Jik(t) is the amount borrowed by bank i from bank k so that the total
liabilities of bank i are:
Li(t) = di(t) +
∑
k∈γi
Jik. (3)
The difference between total assets and total liabilities of a bank i is the
banks capital:
Ei(t) = Ai(t)− Li(t). (4)
The above equation is the Balance Sheet Equation. For the purpose of this
model, we consider loss absorbing Tier 1 capital as capital only.
The stress criteria is modelled by using the balance sheet test to determine
insolvency, as outlined in [30]. Namely, a bank is said to be in stress if assets
are less than liabilities at time t, i.e. the Distress Condition is:
Ai(t) < Li(t). (5)
Table 1 summarizes the variables used in this model.
Given that the state of a bank i is determined by the Distress Condition 5,
consequently the state of a bank at time t+ 1 is
Si(t+ 1) = H(Ai(t)− Li(t)), (6)
5Table 1 Variables of bank i at time t used in the balance sheet model. Si(t)
describes the state of bank i, Jik(t) the loan from bank k to bank i. Similarly, Jki(t)
the loan from bank i to bank k. The set νi denotes the set of loaners and borrowers
on the interbank market of bank i such that the total interbank loans from bank
i to bank k are
∑
k∈νi Jki(t)Sk(t), and bank i borrows on the interbank market
a total amount of
∑
k∈γi Jik from its loaner banks k. The non-interbank assets
are represented by gi(t), and di(t) denotes customer deposits and Ei(t) denotes the
bank’s loss absorbing capital. The total assets are Ai(t) = gi(t)+
∑
k∈νi Jki(t)Sk(t),
and the total liabilities are Li(t) = Ei(t) + di(t) +
∑
k∈γi Jik.
Variable Description of variables
Si(t) State
Jki(t) Interbank loan from bank k to bank i
gi(t) Non-interbank assets of bank i
Ei(t) Capital
di(t) Customer deposits∑
k∈νi Jki(t)Sk(t) Total interbank loans∑
k∈γi Jik Total interbank borrowing
Ai(t) Total assets
Li(t) Total liabilities
where H(x) is the Heaviside function. In the Ising model literature describing
spin systems, Ui(t) = Ai(t)−Li(t) is called the ‘incentive function’ [18]. The
probability of bank i to be in a particular state, using the logit rule (which is
a standard choice to determine the probability of a spin being in a particular
state) is:
P (Si(t) = 1|Ui(t− 1)) = 11+exp(−βUi(t−1)) , (7)
where β is the inverse temperature of the spin system. When β tends to zero
(infinite temperature limit) the incentive do not influence the state of the
bank. Hence, bank i is normally operating or under stress with probability
1/2. Conversely, when β tends to infinity (zero temperature limit) than Eq. 6
is recovered. Thus, our stylized banking system is a zero temperature Ising
model.
3 Uniform, Mean-Field solution
In order to obtain a closed form expression for the stability of the banking
system, let us here introduce a few assumptions.
We are looking at the instantaneous stress imposed on a banking system
given a particular distribution of non-interbank assets and liabilities. Hence,
any changes in the investment after the system is distressed are neglected,
as the time to counteract is considered longer than the instantaneous stress
imposed by distressed banks to its creditors. Therefore, we consider most of
the balance sheet quantities to be constant in time. Specifically, we consider
that the process of stressing a bank, and the consequent loss of the interbank
loan, are much more imminent than the distribution of any assets belonging
to a distressed bank. Therefore, even if the creditor of a bank is bankrupt,
6the bank has still to pay any outstanding loans towards the defaulted bank,
assuming further that transfers of asset belonging to the distressed bank to
counter parties are excluded. Hence, we say that the liabilities, Li(t) = Li
are constant in t and vary from bank to bank as drawn from a random
distribution.
The non-interbank assets gi(t) = gi are also considered constant in t
and drawn from a random distribution. This represents different investment
decisions, and henceforth, different investment returns. For interbank loans,
we assume a mean field, i.e. the average amount loaned by bank i to all
its debtors,
∑
k∈νi Jki(t)Sk(t), is approximated with zJpt, where z is the
average number of banks that are borrowing money from a given bank, J is
the average loan borrowed from one bank to another and pt is the fraction
of operating banks at a given time t. Finally, we consider that the number of
banks in the system M and the bank interconnections are very large.
Let pr be the fraction of normally operating banks after r rounds of
default. By using the above assumptions, from Eq.6, we can write the fraction
of non-defaulted banks after r rounds of default as
pr =
1
M
∑
iH(gi + zJpr−1 − Li), (8)
which is
pr = F (pr−1), (9)
where F (x) = 1 − P (gi − Li < −zJx) is a cumulative distribution function
(CDF). Given the initial fraction, p0, of surviving banks (note that p0 can
differ from one), the solution of Eq.9 is a fixed point probability satisfying p =
F (p) that may depend on the initial fraction of distressed banks. Note that, a
distressed bank (Si(t) = 0) can recover and change its state to Si(t+1) = 1 if
the difference between liabilities and total assets is positive: Ai(t) > Li. This
possibility can occur whenever capital is introduced to a distressed bank,
as done via quantitative easing (QE) or government bail-outs. The cost of
returning to a stable system, and more details about capital injections are
discussed in Section 4.4.
Let us here use the assumption, that gi and Li are independent and
follow distributions in the location-scale family with mean µg and µL, and
standard deviation σg and σL, respectively. Then the random variable gi−Li
has mean µ = µg − µL and standard deviation σ =
√
σ2g + σ
2
L. Thus, the
mean µ can be thought of as the mean of the loss absorbing capital minus the
average interbank lending and the standard deviation σ represent the level
of uncertainty of the predicted value for non-interbank assets and liabilities.
For convenience, let us introduce the following two variables:
a =
µL − µg
σ
; (10)
and
b =
zJ
σ
. (11)
In the following we will assume that the random variables are drawn from
a normal distribution. Note, this assumption is not necessary and other kinds
7of distributions can be explored with a similar approach. To transform the
CDF into a standard normal CDF, let gi − Li = µ + σi, where i is taken
from a standard normal distribution. Then the Distress Condition, Eq. 5,
becomes i < a− bpr.
Let us note that Eq. 9 belongs to the group of Random Field Ising models
(RFIM) or moving equilibrium models in the innovation diffusion literature
[13]. In the RFIM literature, the parameter b models the influence of agents
on other agents. In our model b describes the average loan divided by a fixed
variance of the non-interbank assets and liabilities, and hence, b is always
positive. When b is negative, banks would have to pay their loaners to keep
the loans. When b equals zero, then, whether a bank is distressed, depends
solely on the distributions of the non-interbank assets and liabilities. Since,
the variables i are from a standard normal distribution, it is to be expected
that half the banks are distressed when a and b equal zero. Conversely, when
b becomes larger, i.e. when the average total interbank loan becomes larger,
or when the sum of the variances on the non-interbank assets and liabilities
becomes smaller, then, for a fixed a, the system is more resilient. However, we
will see in Section 4.4, there exists a critical value bc at which the behaviour
of the system changes from a smooth decline in normally operating banks to
a sudden decrease.
The parameter a is the difference between the mean values of liabilities
and non-interbank assets divided by the variance of non-interbank assets and
liabilities. If a is negative, then the mean value of non-interbank assets are
larger than the liabilities. The denominator of a is the standard deviation,
σ, of the sum of the variance of non-interbank assets and the liabilities.
Therefore, if a is negative, then a small σ implies that a becomes even more
negative, leading to a more stable system. However, if a is positive, then a
small σ leads to a more unstable system. Instead, if the mean value of non-
interbank asset is sufficient to counter the liabilities, i.e. a  0, a large σ
would imply that for some banks, their non-interbank assets would not be
enough to satisfy the Distress Condition 5. Henceforth, if the interbank loans
are not sufficient, these banks are under stress. Conversely, if a 0, then a
large σ is desirable, as this implies that for some banks, their non-interbank
asset value is higher than the average value. Thus, these banks can satisfy
the Distress Condition 5, and will operate normally.
4 Results
4.1 Fixed points
To study the behaviour of the iteration map in Eq. 9, we investigate when
it reaches a fixed point p, such that p = F (p). From Eq. 9, by using the
standard normal distribution, we can write:
F (x) = 1− Φ(a− bx), (12)
where Φ(x) is the standard normal CDF for x ∈ [0, 1]. Note, that the following
discussion can be repeated with another location-scale distribution.
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Fig. 2 The first row of this figure shows F (p) form Eq. 12 vs. p for r = 0, ..., 100
with various combinations of parameters a and b. The second row shows plots of
p−F (p). The extreme values, x1 and x2, of p−F (p) are indicated with a cross and
the corresponding fixed points, w1, w2 and w3 are the points where p−F (p) crosses
zero. The arrows indicate which fixed point is reached starting at a particular p0.
In order to investigate the fixed point we report in Figure 2 (first row)
various plots of the iteration map F (x) for different values of a and b for r
from r = 0 to r = 100. It becomes clear, that, given particular parameter
values, and the same starting value, the fixed points change. This is better
illustrated in the second row of Figure 2 where p − F (p) is plotted which
crosses zero at the fixed point. It becomes clear, that up to three fixed points
can occur. Namely, if b < bc =
√
2pi, only one fixed point occurs. If b >
bc, then three fixed points, w1, w2, w3, become possible. That is because,
whenever b > bc, the function x − F (x) has extrema at x1,2 = b−1(a ∓√
2 ln b√
bc
) (where x1 is a maximum and x2 is a minima) if a ∈ [a1, a2], where
a1 = b +
√
2 ln bbc − bΦ(
√
2 ln bbc ) and a2 = b −
√
2 ln bbc − bΦ(−
√
2 ln bbc ).
Note that, w1 ≤ x1 ≤ w2 ≤ x2 ≤ w3. We have F ′(w1) < 1 indicating that
the fixed point w1 is stable. Similarly, w3 is stable, and, because the iteration
map is one-dimensional, w2 is unstable. Thus, the fixed point w2 forms a
barrier.
If a < a1, or a > a2, then p = F (p) has only one solution, w1, which is a
stable fixed point.
Consider the case when a ∈ (a1, a2). If the starting value p0 is in the orbit
[0, w1] or [w3, 1], then the attracting fixed points are w1 or w3, respectively.
If p0 ∈ [w1, w2], then w2 is a repelling fixed point and w1 is the attracting
fixed point that is eventually reached. Similarly, if p0 ∈ [w2, w3], the fixed
point eventually reached is w3.
If a = a1, then the fixed points w1 and w2 merge, and w1 = x1 = w2.
This implies that the left-hand side of the fixed point w1 = w2 is stable,
however the right-hand side of the fixed point w1 = w2 is unstable. Hence, if
a starting value p0 is in the orbit [0, w1 = w2], then the fixed point reached
9is w1. However, if p0 ∈ [w1 = w2, w3], then the fixed point reached is w3. For
p0 ∈ [w3, 1] the attracting fixed point is again w3.
In the case if a = a2, then w2 = x2 = w3, i.e. w2 and w3 merge implying
that if p0 ∈ [w1, w2 = w3], then w1 is the attracting fixed point. If p0 ∈ [0, w1]
or p0 ∈ [w3, 1], then the fixed points reached are w1 and w3, respectively.
In terms of the stability of the modeled banking system we note that
when b > bc a barrier, represented by the unstable fixed point, can occur,
such that the number of operating banks does not decrease below a certain
value (or increases above a certain value). However, if there is a change in the
parameter values, then it becomes possible that the entire system suddenly
collapses (or becomes fully functional again). Hence, for b < bc, the system
is reversible, but for b > bc, a hysteresis cycle occurs, such that the system
becomes irreversible, and depends on its history. Therefore, a large amount
of lending on the interbank market (i.e. large b when p0 = 1) can help to
stabilize the system, if the corresponding value for liabilities and mean value
of non-interbank assets are such that a < a2, because in this case the barrier
prevents an entire system failure.
4.2 Change in the number of surviving banks induced by one bank failure
For a small change from pr to pr+1, the change in the number of surviving
banks is given by MF ′(pr) . Note that F ′(x) is the probability density func-
tion that i = a − bx. Thus, the number of banks becoming distressed as a
consequence of one bank changing from operating normally to distressed in
the next iteration is [17]:
n = F ′(x). (13)
If n is less than one, any avalanche will eventually stop. Whereas, if n ≥ 1 one
bank default can trigger an entire system failure. Starting with p0 = 1, for
b > bc and x = x1, n is precisely one. The maximum of F
′(x) is reached when
x = a/b. At this point the number of stressed banks triggered by one bank
in the following iteration is of order z suggesting that all the neighbouring
banks of the initially distressed bank become all distressed as well.
4.3 Relation between a and b
For fixed capital E(p), the parameters a and b are dependent on one other
such that the parameter a can be expressed in terms of b as:
a = −E(p)
σ
+ bpr. (14)
where E(p) = µg + bpσ−µL. Thus, a change in a given a fixed b at the fixed
point p can only happen when external capital is introduced to the system.
There are multiple ways of increasing capital of a bank. For instance, a bank
can raise capital by issuing shares. Given the thread of default a government
can intervene by inducing capital into the distressed bank via government
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bailouts. Further, central banks use methods of QE by adjusting interest
rates and lending to banks, or buying assets using open market operations.
Hence, QE can ensure that liabilities are reduced using the central bank loans
with smaller interest rates than otherwise required by the interbank market
and assets are liquidated above the market value ensuring that capital is not
needed to overcome losses when faced by liquidity shortages.
4.4 Parameter analysis
We have observed that when b becomes larger than the critical value bc,
the system passes form a reversible kind of dynamics to an irreversible one
where hysteresis cycles emerge. This is illustrated in Figure 3 where the fixed
point probability values are plotted for varying a for various b ranging from
b = 0, ..., 15. The solid blue lines indicate the stable fixed points, whereas the
blue dashed lines indicate the unstable fixed points. The hysteresis cycle is
indicated by the red arrows.
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Fig. 3 This figure shows the fraction of surviving banks as a function of the param-
eter a for given fixed values of b. The blue graphs are the solution of the Iteration
Function 12 for different b values whereby b = 1, ..., 15. The solid lines indicate
stable fixed points whereas the dotted lines indicate unstable fixed points. If the
fixed point is unique as in the case for b = 1, 2, no hysteresis occurs for decreasing
or increasing a. For this value of b > bc and a particular range of a three fixed
points become possible leading to a hysteresis cycle. The thick blue line indicates
the fixed points for b = 7. The red arrows indicate the hysteresis cycle that occurs
for b = 7. Starting from p0 = 1, the parameter a needs to increase to a = a2 ≈ 5.04
for the entire system to default. If the starting value is p0 = 0 then a needs to
decrease to a = a1 ≈ 1.96 for the banks to be operating. Thus, the path is history
depended.
We can observe that at b = 0, when banks are not lending to each other,
the system is stable for negative values of a; fluctuations in the assets side
of the balance sheet equation can cause banks to fail and, at a = 0, half
the banks in the system are in distress. By lending money from one bank to
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another (b > 0), the system becomes more stable with smaller numbers of
banks in distress for the same values of a.
If a increases further but b is kept constant, then more banks fail as the
difference between the banks non-interbank assets and liabilities increases.
Hence, the capital in the system is lowered. If b is below its critical value, then
the system is reversible and all fixed points are stable. If b becomes larger
than the critical value bc and a < a2, almost the entire system is stable (if
p0 = 1) because of the barrier. However, when a increases above a2, then the
whole system suddenly crashes.
Also, if a is constant but b decreases, then a sudden jump becomes possible
as well. Let us here note that a decrease in b happens, if the average interbank
loans zJ decrease, or the variance σ =
√
σg(t)2 + σL(t)2 increases. In [36], it
was shown that during the financial crisis, there was indeed a decrease in the
amount of money loaned but also the interest rates for loans increased. Thus,
b decreased, and a increased. In our stylized system this is a mechanism that
would create disastrous consequences unless b < bc.
In order to return to a normally operating system after the crash, a needs
to be reduced at least to a1. Then a sudden jump brings the whole system
operative again. Hence, the cost of rescuing a banking system is given by the
difference between a1(b(t)) and a2(b(t + δt)), where b(t) is the value of b at
the beginning of the crisis and b(t+ δt) the value of b at the time of rescue.
To be more specific, let us here discuss the case b = 7 and starting from
fully operating banks (i.e. p0 = 1). Here the infinite avalanche occurs when a
reaches a2 ≈ 5.04. Whereas, if one starts with all banks distressed, a would
need to be lowered to a1 ≈ 1.96, in order to return to a stable system. In
Figure 3, this cost is indicated by the green arrow.
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Fig. 4 The figures show the fraction of operating banks for given a and b obtained
by numerically solving the Iteration Function 12 starting from an initial value
p0 = 1 (plot A) and p0 = 0 (plot B). The hysteresis behaviour becomes visible
form the jump occurring in (A) at a = a2 and in (B) at a = a1.
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Figure 4 is a plot of the equilibrium fraction of normally operating banks
for different parameter values. The figure contains two plots A and B, and
depicts the solution of Eq. 9 for different values of a and b when the initial
state of all banks is p0 = 1 (plot A) or p0 = 0 (plot B). Whenever b = 0,
the fraction of operating banks depends only on the CDF of non-interbank
assets. In the case, of the standard normal CDF, for a = 0 half of the banks
are expected to be under stress; at a = −2.5 the equilibrium fraction of
operating banks is p ≈ 0.9938; whereas for a = 2.5 the equilibrium fraction
of operating banks is p ≈ 0.0062. If 0 < b < bc, the system becomes more
stable which is obvious as the asset side of the balance sheet is increased and
the interbank loans act as an extra asset. If a is kept constant then either
extra capital is introduced in the system or the values µL, µg, σL and σg
change such that a stays constant. Further, for values of b in that range, the
decline in the fraction of normally operating banks for increasing a is still
smooth. When b > bc, the fraction of operating banks suddenly jumps from
almost all operating to almost all banks in stress, which happens because of
the occurrence of the multiple fixed points as outlined in Section 4.1.
4.5 Leverage
For a stable system (i.e. p ≈ 1) with b > bc, the ratios between assets and
liabilities should ensure that a ≤ a2. Using the mean-field assumption, the
interbank assets of a bank are a fraction θ of the total mean assets, i.e.
zJ = θµA (where µA = µg + zJp0). Further using Eq. 14, this implies that
the leverage ratio - the ratio of capital to total assets, i.e. γ = µEµA , should
satisfy the following condition to ensure a stable banking system:
γ ≥ θc
bc
√
2 ln
θ
θc
+ θΦ
(
−
√
2 ln
θ
θc
)
, (15)
where θc =
σbc
µA
. Figure 5 is a plot of Eq. 15 depicting the minimal value
of the leverage, γmin, at which the system is stable as a function of θ, of
interbank assets to total assets for given values of σ. The value of σ is chosen
to be a fraction of the mean total assets for each graph as applicable in the
accompanying legend. We chose to represent σ in this way as then Eq. 15
becomes independent of µA. Any leverage value above and including γmin
ensures a safe banking system given a particular σ.
It becomes clear that the larger σ the larger θ has to be to be greater
than θc in order to observe the jump and henceforth a system-wide failure of
the banking system. However, the leverage requirement also needs to increase
significantly in order for the banking system to be stable.
4.6 Collateralized lending
The effects of collateralized lending can be discussed by adding qzJ(1 − pt)
to the sum of total assets. The parameter q ∈ [0, 1] indicates the average
amount a bank can expect as collateral when counter parties become unable
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Fig. 5 The figure shows the minimum leverage, γmin, for an average bank to ensure
a stable banking system as a function of the fraction of innterbank assets θ. The
different curves correspond to various σ’s. From the figure, we can conduct that
the larger σ the larger a θ is required for the jump to occur.
to pay back loans. Another way of thinking about this term is the value of
a defaulted loan, i.e. any possible payback during the insolvency procedure.
The term qzJ(1− pt) shifts the point of systemic failure and the variables a
and b including collateralized loans need to be adjusted to
a′ =
µL − µg + qzJ
σ
; (16)
and
b′ =
zJ(1− q)
σ
. (17)
A plot of the fixed points of the Iteration Function 12 using a′ and b′ is
given in Figure 10 in Section 5.5.
5 Simulation
5.1 Simulation Set-Up
The mean-field assumption of the interbank market implies that each bank
lends the same amount to all other banks. Hence when using the mean-field
assumption the network structure is a fully connected graph. Further, normal
fluctuations for the value of the non-interbank assets have been assumed in
the analysis done so far. To test the effects of different network structures
and distributions, we use a simulation approach similar to the one in [25].
The banking system modelled in our simulations still represents a highly
stylized banking system as we restrict the simulations to banks with balance
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sheets of similar size leaving the effects of a heterogeneous banking system
to a later stage. The simulation results are intended to verify that the overall
behaviour and the hysteresis effect can be retrieved also by using different
network structures and different distributions for liabilities and assets.
As before, the system consists of M banks. Each bank i is initially cal-
ibrated with liabilities Li(0) and assets Ai(0) drawn respectively from dis-
tributions with mean µL and variance σ
2
L (for liabilities) and mean µA and
variance σ2A (for assets). For the interbank assets, we use a fraction θ ∈ [0, 1]
of the total assets Ai(0) of bank i such that the total interbank assets of
bank i are θAi(0). The interbank lending structure is given by the network
G = {g1≤ij≤M}, where gij = 1 if bank i loans to bank j and 0 otherwise.
The individual loans from bank i to its neighbouring banks j are the total
interbank assets divided by the degree zi of bank i, i.e. the amount loaned
from bank i to bank j is θAigi,j/zi.
The distributions tested are Normal distribution and Student’s t-distribution.
To calibrate total assets and total liabilities with Normal distributions, ran-
dom variables i are drawn from a standard normal distribution; the total
assets are Ai(0) = µA+σA
A
i and the total liabilities are Li(0) = µL+σL
L
i .
Similarly, if the distribution used to calibrate total assets and total liabilities
is the Student’s t distribution, random variables tLi , t
A
i are drawn from a
standard Student’s t distribution with degree of freedom ν. The total assets
and liabilities are given by Ai(0) = µA + σAt
A
i and Li(0) = µL + σLt
L
i . Note
that the random variables L,Ai and t
L,A
i are different and independent.
For constructing the underlying exposure network structure G, we used
three different standard network types: the Erdo˝s-Re´ny network, the Small-
World network [50] and a core-periphery network produced using the prefer-
ential attachment algorithm as outlined in [5]. For the Erdo˝s-Re´ny network,
a bank i is connected to a bank j with probability α. For the Small-World
network, we used an initial network where each bank is connected to its c
closest neighbours and a probability β is used to re-wire any existing links
between the neighbouring banks to other banks creating the small-world ef-
fect. For the core-periphery network, we used an Erdo˝s-Re´ny seed network
of banks with a connection probability of α and added ‘perioheral’ banks
individually to the system using preferential attachment.
We would like to stress that the network structures as well as the distri-
butions are standard choices and reality might differ greatly. The different
structures and distributions are intended to show that the model predic-
tions are robust for a variety of assumptions. The choice to use Normal and
Student’s t distributions is to compare the results drawn from the iteration
function, as these distributions are part of the location-scale family, and the
mean and variance values for total liabilities and assets can be compared to
the fixed points of the Iteration Function 12. The parameter values used to
initialize the model can be found in Table 2.
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Table 2 Variables and values used for initializing banks balance sheets and exposure structure
in the simulation modelling a stylized banking system. The banking system consist of M = 500
banks. The state of each bank is set to operating initially, i.e. Si(0) = 1 for all banks i. Two
location scale distribution, the normal distribution and the Student t distribution, are used
to calibrate the balance sheets of banks. In particular, the initial value for total asset and
liabilities for bank i are Ai(0) = µA + σA
A
i and Li(0) = µL + σL
L
i for simulations using
normal distributions, and Ai(0) = µA + σAti and Li(0) = µL + σLt
L
i for simulations using
Student t distributions. To compute the structure of the exposure network G = {g1≤i,j≤M},
three different network structures are used: Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks, Small-World networks and a
network structure with a core and periphery banks. For the Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks a link exists
between two banks with probability α = 0.1. To construct the Small-World network, we used
the algorithm from [50] with banks have c = 4 neighbours and a re-wiring probability of each
link of β = 0.1. To create the core-periphery network, we use the algorithm from [5] with an
Erdo˝s-Re´ny network seed network with 50 banks and connection probability α = 0.1 and 450
banks with 15 links added with a preferential attachment to the existing banks as described
in [5]. The weight for a loan from bank i to bank j is θAigi,j/zi, where θ is the fraction of
interbank assets total assets.
Variable Values used for calibration Description of variables
of bank i at time 0
M 500 Number of banks in
the stylised banking system.
A,Li 
A,L
i ∼ N(0, 1) Standard normal random variables.
tA,Li t
A,L
i ∼ T (ν) Standard Student’s t random
variables with degree of freedom ν.
ν 2 Degree of freedom for
Student’s t distribution.
Si(t) Si(0) = 1 State, all banks
are operating initially.
µA 1000 Mean value for
total assets.
σA 30 Standard deviation
for assets.
µL 700 - 1200 Mean value for liabilities.
σL 50 Standard deviation
for liabilities.
θ 0.0, 0.1, 0.3 Fraction for interbank assets
Probability of bank i
being connected with bank j,
α 0.1 used to generate Erdo˝s-Re´ny network
and seed network for the
core-periphery network.
c 4 Neighbouring banks of all bank i
in Small-World network.
β 0.1 Re-wiring probability for a link
in the Small-World network .
For the contagion propagation, we use a similar algorithm as in [25].
Specifically, for each iteration r, the following algorithm is computed:
1. It is simultaneously tested for all banks i whether the total assets of each
bank i is smaller than its total liabilities.
2. If this is the case, then the state of bank i, Si(r), is set to zero, and the
bank is said to be distressed.
3. Eq. 2 is then used to evaluate the total assets of bank i for the next
iteration r + 1.
4. The above steps are repeated until no further default occur.
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When the iteration process stops we obtain the fraction of surviving banks
p by counting the banks that are still operating.
5.2 Comparing with Fixed Point Solution
To compare the fraction of surviving banks with the fixed points of the It-
eration Function 12, we identify (µL − µA)/(σ2A + σ2L)1/2 with a − b and
Jz ≈ θAi(0), where a and b from Eqns. 10 and 11.
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Fig. 6 The figure shows the average error between the solution of the simulation
and Iteration Function 12 of the fraction of surviving banks. The figure reports
the second norms of the difference between the fractions of surviving banks of the
fixed point solutions of Iteration Function 12 and the fraction of surviving banks
of an average of 100 simulations for fixed values (µL−µA)/(σ2A +σ2L)1/2 (changing
µL for different simulations) and a− b (changing a for different fixed points). The
simulation assumes Normal distributions for the balance sheet values and for the
structure of the exposure network Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks with connection probability
α and fraction of interbank loans to total assets θ are used. To test the influence
of the number of links from one bank to others, α is varied in (0, 0.1].
Figure 6 shows the difference between the fraction of surviving banks
computed by using the fixed points of the Iteration Function 12 and the
mean value of the fraction of surviving banks from 100 simulations. In the
simulation, we use Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks as underlying structures for the
exposure networks and Normal distributions for liabilities and assets with
varying mean of the Liabilities µL and connection probability α. The ratio
between interbank assets and total asset θ is set to 0.3. For this value of θ,
b is well above its critical value and a jump is predicted. For the fixed point
equation a is varied to balance the changes in µL in the simulation. The
colour scale in Figure 6 reports the error between the predicted values and
the value archived using the average from 100 simulations. As expected close
to the jump the error is large. However, also for α smaller than 0.03, a large
error is observed. This is because in that region the jump is only marginal or
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does not occur in the simulation implying that due to the smaller number of
links the stress distribution and subsequent cumulative counter party losses
via the network are not realized.
We note that large errors happen in a range close to the jump for connec-
tion probabilities α smaller than 8 · 10−3. In that region the average degree
z¯ of a bank is between 0 and 4 for M = 5001. For α < 10−3, the jump
was not observed or it was not very dominant in the simulation testing. The
amount loaned from one bank to another is still θAi. However, it is a well
known phenomena that the upper critical Euclidean dimension for the mean-
field assumption of the Ising model is 4 [6]. Thus, it becomes clear that the
mean-field approximation does not capture the behaviour for average degrees
smaller than 4 and further investigation needs to be done into whether an
average low number of counter parties in a banking system reduces the risk
of a systemic stress event.
5.3 Normal and Student’s t Distributions
The effects of different underlying distribution are illustrated in Figures 7
and 8. The underlying network structure of the exposure matrix is, in both
figures, an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network.
In Figure 7, we report the average simulated fraction of surviving banks
against (µL − µa)/(σ2A + σ2L)1/2 and the fixed point solution of the Iteration
Function 12 (black line) against a− b. For the simulated fraction, we varied
µL and for the fixed point solution, we changed a to satisfy (µL−µa)/(σ2A +
σ2L)
1/2 ≈ a − b. For each µL, the simulation was repeated 100 times. In the
figure, symbols represent average fractions and vertical error bars are the
standard deviations from the 100 simulations. To test the behaviour of the
simulation for different fractions of average interbank loans, we changed θ
from 0.0 (blue line), to 0.1 (red line) and 0.3 (green line). To compute the
equivalent fixed point solution for each value of θ, we changed the value
for b in the Iteration Function 12 accordingly, i.e. b ≈ θµA/
√
σ2A + σ
2
L. The
critical value for b for the normal distribution is bc =
√
2pi. For the Student’s
t distribution with 2 degrees of freedom, the critical value for b is reached
when bc ≈ 2.82. Hence, θ = 0.1 leads to a value of interbank assets of bank
i below the critical value and, conversly, setting θ = 0.3 creates a value of
interbank assets above the critical value where a jump becomes visible.
The difference between Figures 3 and 7 is that to compute the fixed point
solution in Figure 3, the total assets of the banks are varied as the mean of
non-interbank assets is constant and a change in b implies that either capital
is changed to compensate a decrease or increase in total assets, or µL, µg, σL
and σg change accordingly such that a is constant. Whereas, in Figure 7, the
mean of the total assets of banks is constant and a change in θ does not effect
the size of the balance sheet. Hence, capital stays constant for fixed values
of µL, σL and σg.
The fractions of surviving banks computed in Figure 7 used Normal dis-
tributions (A) and Student’s t distributions (B) to initialize total assets and
1 For an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network is the average degree is z¯ = α(M − 1)
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Fig. 7 The figure shows the fraction of surviving banks p evaluated by initializing
the liabilities and assets of banks’ balance sheets with Normal distributions (A)
and Students’t distributions with 2 degrees of freedom (B) with varying mean µL
and fixed standard deviation σL for liabilities, fixed mean µA and fixed standard
deviation σA for assets plotted against (µL − µA)/(σ2A + σ2L)1/2. Each symbol is
the average of the fraction of surviving banks of 100 simulations. The error bars
are the standard deviation of the 100 simulations. To compute the blue line, we
set the average fraction of interbank loans to zero, i.e. θ = 0.0, for the red line θ
was set to 0.1 and for the green line θ was set to 0.3. The underlying structure
of the exposure networks are Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks with connection probability
α = 0.1 and M = 500 banks. The black lines accompanying each plot are the fixed
points of the Iteration Function 12 plotted against a − b which is approximately
(µL − µA)/(σ2A + σ2L)1/2. Note that b is changed to fit the equivalent θ value. A
steep decline in the fraction of surviving banks happens when θ equals to 0.3 in
the area of the predicted jump. For θ equal to 0.0 and 0.1 the simulation result for
both distributions are close to the fixed point solution of the Iteration Function 12.
The parameter values used to initialize the system are stated in Table 2.
total liabilities. Similarly, to compute the fixed point solutions, we used a
standard normal CDF in A and a standard Student’s t CDF in B.
We note that, for θ = 0.3 more banks default for the same values of
µA, µL, σA and σL than when θ = 0. The reason is that there exists no
counter party risk when θ = 0.0. For both distributions a sudden decrease
in the fraction of surviving banks is observed for θ = 0.3. The jump starts
earlier for the banking system with banks initialized with the Student’s t
distribution than for banks initialized with the Normal distribution. Also, the
simulation results for a banking system initialized with Normal distributions
are a closer fit to the fixed point solutions of the Iteration Function 12,
nonetheless the simulated results initialized with the Student’s t distribution
are also reasonable close to the fixed points. In the proximity of the jump, the
standard deviation of the simulated fractions of surviving banks increases.
This indicates that for the values of µA, µL, σA and σL, at which the jump
occurs, either most of the banks are operating or most of the banks are in
distress with no intermediate state.
To investigate this behaviour for parameter values close to the jump, we
plotted the frequency distribution for fixed values of µA, µL, σA and σL in
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Fig. 8 This figure shows the frequency distribution of fractions of surviving banks
p for banks initialized with Normal (A) and Student’s t distribution (B) for fixed
values of µL, µA, σL and σA. The fraction of interbank loans to total assets θ is
set to 0.3 and the underlying structure of the exposure network is an Erdo˝s-Re´ny
network. To observe the behaviour in the proximity of the jump the values for µL
where set to 890 for the Normal distribution and 870 for the Student’s t distribution.
To compute the frequency distribution, we repeated the simulation 10000 times.
Two peaks occur because of perturbations of the balance sheet values due to the
randomness. The two peaks are visible in both sub-plots at the end and beginning
of the scale of p indicating that most of the banks in the banking system either
survive or are distressed. Intermediate fractions of surviving banks do not occur.
proximity of the jump in Figure 8. We used different values of µL for the
simulations when initializing with Normal distributions (µL = 890) and Stu-
dent’s t distribution (µL = 870). This is because of the jump starting earlier
for the Student’s t distribution than for the Normal distribution. The value
for θ is set to 0.3 again. To determine the frequency distribution, we repeated
the default algorithm for the fixed values of µA, µL, σA and σL 10,000 times
and sum the occurrence of the same equilibrium fraction of surviving banks.
Sub-plot A shows the results for simulations using the Normal distribution
and sub-plot B shows the results for simulations using the Student’s t distri-
bution. For both distributions, two peaks occur. The peaks of the frequency
distribution for a banking system initialized with the Normal distribution
occur around p close to zero and for p between 0.9 and 1.0. The first peak
for the fraction of surviving banks for a banking system with balance sheets
initialized with the Student’s t distribution happen between 0.01 and 0.15
and the second peak for values of p between 0.65 and 0.95. Values of frac-
tions of surviving banks between the two peaks do not occur. The lack of
intermediate values is due to the stable and unstable fixed points. The un-
stable fixed point forms a barrier between the stable fixed points. However,
slight perturbations of the values of banks assets and liabilities caused by the
randomness of the simulation either tip the banking system into distress or
survival.
The number of banks defaulting before the sudden system failure happens
when initialized with the Normal distribution is less than for a banking sys-
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tem initialized with the Student’s t distribution. The Student’s t distribution
is a fat tail distribution implying that banks balance sheets differ more than
when the balance sheet values are distributed with a Normal distribution.
Thus, after the jump some banks have a greater chance of survival, as they
have more capital, than other members of the banking system. However, be-
cause of the greater diversity, some banks also have less capital than other
banks, causing the system failure to happen for a smaller mean value of liabil-
ities in comparison to a more homogeneous banking system when initialized
with the Normal distribution. Thus, the more diverse system is more prone
to failure but chances of survival of some banks are larger than for a more
homogeneous banking system.
5.4 Network Influence
Interbank networks of various countries (Austria [12], Brazil [16], UK [39],
Italy [36], etc.) have been studied with the outcome that the networks do not
resemble Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks. Instead, they consist of “low clustering coef-
ficients with short average path length ” [12] and the links in the interbank
networks resembling the exposure from one bank to others are distributed
with tails exhibiting “a linear decay in log-scale, suggesting a heavy Pareto
tail” [16] indicating a core-periphery structure with banks in the centre be-
ing highly connected and periphery banks being connected to the core banks
[49].
In Figure 9, we test the influence of other exposure network structures
than the Erdo˝s-Re´ny network. The distributions used to initialize the bal-
ance sheets for both sub-plots are Normal distributions. The structure of the
outline of Figure 9 is similar to the one in Figure 7. Again, we plotted the
average fraction of 100 trials of surviving banks for a θ of 0.3 (green line),
0.1 (red line) and 0.0 (blue line) against (µL−µa)/(σ2A + σ2L)1/2 varying µL.
The black lines are the solution of the fixed points of Eq. 12 for changing
b to match the equivalent value of θ. Plot A shows the results given that
the underlying exposure network has a Small-World structure and in plot
B, the underlying exposure network structure uses the preferential attach-
ment algorithm to create a core-periphery structure. To tidily connected the
core banks, we used Erdo˝s-Re´ny core networks made out off 50 banks with
a connection probability α of 0.75. The remaining 450 periphery banks are
added one-by-one connecting to 15 banks using the preferential attachment
algorithm.
The simulation results using both network structures are reasonable close
to the fixed point solutions of the Iteration Function 12 with a steep decline
in surviving banks for θ = 0.3.
The steep decline of p when the Small-World network is used starts a
bit earlier than the predicted jump in the mean-field. Before the rewiring
process, the Small-World network is an ordered lattice. The Ising model on
an ordered lattice can be approximated using the mean-field solution as long
as the number of close neighbours is larger than 4. The re-wiring creates
long-distance links between banks distributing the shock quicker through
the network.
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Fig. 9 The figure shows the average fraction of surviving banks p computed using
100 simulations plotted against (µL − µA)/(σ2A + σ2L)1/2. The balance sheet values
are normally distributed. The underlying structure of the exposure networks are
Small-World with neighbouring nodes c = 12 and a re-wiring probability β set
to 0.1 (A) and core-periphery networks with a strongly connected cores created
using Erdo˝s-Re´ny networks with connection probability α = 0.75 and 50 banks,
and 450 periphery banks that are added one by one and joint to 50 already existing
banks using the preferential attachment algorithm. As in Figure 7, for a fraction
of interbank assets to total assets, p is plotted using green symbols, for θ = 0.1 we
used red symbols and for 0.0 blue symbols were used. The error bar is the standard
deviation of the results of 100 trials. The black line represents the fixed points
of the Iteration Function 12 plotted against a − b for changing θ as used in the
simulation. The values of p for the simulation and the Iteration Function 12 are for
both network structures reasonable close and the steep decrease in the proximity
of the jump are for both network structures observable.
Thus, it can be said that the network influence is marginal given that the
number of lending banks is large enough. This can be explained using the
results in Section 4.2. There, we showed that when pr = x1 (and assuming a
small change from pr to pr−1), the average number of banks failing as a result
of one distressed bank is one again. Therefore, this implies that when capital
is low the distress of one bank causes a chain of distress in connected banks
resulting in distress throughout the entire system implying that the network
structure is secondary. However, is has been reported that in the real world
networks, periphery banks are of smaller size than core banks, which we did
not account for and might lead to a different result.
5.5 Collaterals
To incorporate collaterals of a lending agreement we add the following term
to total assets, Ai(r), of bank i in round r:
M∑
j=1
qθAigi,j(1− Sj(r)), (18)
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where q ∈ [0,∞] accounts for the value difference of the loan from bank
i to bank j and the collateral bank j has to pay whenever it cannot pay its
outstanding credit.
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Fig. 10 The figure shows the average fraction of surviving banks p computed
using 100 simulations plotted against (µL − µA)/(σ2A + σ2L)1/2. The balance sheet
values are normally distributed. The underlying structure of the exposure network
is an Erdo˝s-Re´ny network. A collateral term was added when the total assets where
computed during simulation modelling. The collateral on loans becomes active after
the loaner defaulted. The black line represents the fixed points of the Iteration
Function 12 using a′ and b′ as given in Eqns. 16 and 17 to compute the fixed point.
The fixed points are plotted against a′ − b′ (θ = 0.3 was used in the simulation).
The different coloured lines represent varying fractions q such that the value of
the collateral for any loan from bank i to bank j is qθAigi,j . For increasing q the
interbank interaction is reduced such that for q = 1 the interbank loans can be
disregarded.
Figure 10 is a plot of the fraction of surviving banks p using simulation
testing including the collateral term and the fixed point solution of the Iter-
ation Function 12 using a′ and b′ as given in Eqns. 16 and 17. The average
fraction of surviving banks was plotted for 100 trials along with the errorbars
(coloured lines) for fixed θ = 0.3. The black line are the fixed point solutions
of the Iteration Function 12. The different colours represent varying fractions
of q. For increasing q the interaction in form of the interbank loans between
banks can be disregarded. However, for lower values of q the jump can still
be observed.
6 Analysis of real banking system data
Banks report their balance sheet quantities yearly as part of their financial
statement in their annual report. We used Bankscope [14] to collect data for
US and UK banks2. The data includes consolidated values for some banks
2 The query settings were on ”Status: Active Banks, Inactive Banks”, ”Specialisa-
tion: Commercial banks, Savings banks, Cooperative banks, Real Estate & Mort-
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Table 3 The table reports the mean value of total assets µA and Tier 1 capital
of banks µE and the standard deviations for the years 2007 and 2012 for the UK
and US banking system. The data is from Bankscope. We only considered banks
that reported their Tier 1 capital. Thus, the table additionally states the number
of banks. To compare the Tier 1 capital, we also stated the leverage ratio γ, i.e.
Tier 1 capital to total assets.
UK USA
2007 in GBP 2012 in GBP 2007 in USD 2012 in USD
µA 2.0287e+11 1.8307e+11 1.8505e+10 2.0247e+10
STD 4.7503e+11 4.2912e+11 1.3592e+11 1.5234e+11
µE 6.3032e+09 8.1836e+09 1.0615e+09 1.5829e+09
STD 1.3785e+10 2.0298e+10 6.6785e+09 1.1102e+10
Leverage, γ 0.0311 0.0447 0.0574 0.0782
No. banks 26 38 666 779
and unconsolidated values for others. Only using the values from consolidated
balance sheets would have reduced the list of banks considerably mostly
excluding foreign subsidiaries of foreign banks. We chose the years 2007 and
2012 as reference years, to determine the stability of the UK and US banking
system during the recent financial crisis and a non-crisis time. The parameters
µA and µE represent the ”true” of the average value of total assets and capital
per bank.
The two quantities that are decisive for the stability of the banking sys-
tem in our model are the mean of the total assets µA = µg + θµAp0 (with
p0 = 1) and the mean of loss absorbing capital µE = µA − µL. We are using
the ”Tier 1 Capital” and ”Total Assets” as reported in Bankscope. It should
be noted that the UK and US use different accounting systems leading to dif-
ferent estimations for the value of the same asset and liabilities. Henceforth,
the value of total assets, total liabilities and Tier 1 capital for UK and US
banks reported in Bankscope cannot be compared country wise. However, it
is possible to discuss changes in financial stability of the banking systems in
a country for different years. To compute the mean values for µA and µE
we only use banks with Tier 1 capital larger than zero this reduced the list
of banks considerably (especially in 2007) as Bankscope does not report the
Tier 1 capital value for all banks. The mean values as well as the number
of banks used to compute the values can be found in Table 3. To compare
the values for Tier 1 capital and total assets in the different years, we also
included leverage, γ in the table. It becomes clear that in 2007 the average
leverage both in the US and UK was less than it was in 2012 and henceforth
already implies a less stable system in 2007.
The parameter σ is a free model parameter that indicates the uncertainty
about the value of asset and liabilities. More precisely σg increases if the
value for non-interbank assets is uncertain. Similarly, difficulties in obtaining
gage banks, Investment banks, Islamic banks, Other non banking credit institu-
tions, Bank holdings & Holding companies, Private banking / Asset management
companies” and ”Ultimate Owner: Def. of the UO: min. path of 50.01%, known
or unknown shareh., closest quoted company in the path leading to the Ultimate
Owner (if any); GUO and DUO”
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funding from banks or other funding sources are represented in an increased
σL. In a way σ is measures the severity of the shock and hence we tested for
different values of σ. To calibrate σ, we use a variable f ∈ [0, 1] and say that
σ is a fraction of the mean value of the Tier 1 capital, µE . Strictly speaking,
σ as discussed in the above analysis of the homogeneous banking model is
the standard deviation of µL − µg, but as seen in Section 5 the difference
between the standard deviation of µL − µg and −µE = µL − µA is minimal.
Another parameter that cannot be easily obtained from the annual ac-
count data is the average fraction of interbank assets, θ. Banks report their
lending to other banks under ”Loans and advances to banks” and ”Deposits
by banks” in their annual reports. However, as it is pointed out in [39] loans
and advances to banks are not the only exposure banks have to other banks.
Such that to monitor the UK interbank market the Prudential Risk Author-
ity (PRA) collects data about other financial instruments that form part of
the interbank market. In particular [39] list: ”prime lending (...); holdings
of capital and fixed-income securities issued by banks; credit default swaps
bought and sold; securities lending and borrowing (...); repo and reverse repo
(...); derivatives exposure (...); settlement and clearing lines; asset-backed se-
curities; covered bonds; and short-term lending with respect to other banks
and broker dealers”. The balance sheet data reported in the annual reports
does not differentiate between the interbank market and products obtained
from other financial institutions. Still using only the values for ”Loans and
advances to banks” or ”Deposits by banks” to calibrate θ would underes-
timate the average fraction of interbank lending. Henceforth, we again use
multiple values of θ to test the stability of the system.
Figures 11 and 13 show various plots the fraction of surviving banks, p,
plotted against the fraction of σ to the mean Tier 1 capital µE , f for the UK
and US system, respectively. The fraction of surviving banks is calculated
using the fixed points of Eq. 12 using a standard normal CDF as before.
The value of the fraction of interbank lending to total assets, θ is fixed and
given above each sub plot. The blue crosses indicate the fraction of surviving
banks for a banking system calibrated with the 2007 data and the black circles
symbolizes the fraction of surviving banks for a banking system calibrated
with the 2012 data.
For θ set to zero the fraction of surviving banks in the UK banking system
is almost identical (Figure 11). The number of surviving banks declines for
a larger f . However, even for f tending to one more than 85% of banks are
operating in both 2007 and 2012. Note that θ equal to zero corresponds to
no interbank lending. The number of distressed banks is only due to the
uncertainty of the value of liabilities and non-interbank assets caused by a
large σ. For the range of σ from zero to the size of µE , no systemic event, i.e.
the entire failure of the banking system, becomes possible in both years given
that there is only a shock to the value of non-interbank assets or liabilities.
For the next graphs in Figure 11 in the first row θ is increased to 0.03 and
0.07. It becomes clear that the fraction of surviving banks deviates for 2007
and 2012 with p for 2007 being considerable less than p for 2012 implying
that the banking system 2007 was much more prone to failure. For θ = 0.07
and the banking system calibrated with the 2007 data set, a jump becomes
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Fig. 11 The sub plots show the fraction of surviving banks for the years 2007
(blue crosses) and 2012 (black circles) against the fraction of σ to mean value
of capital, f, for various values of the fraction of interbank assets to total assets,
θ. To calibrate the model, the mean of total assets, µA, and the mean of Tier 1
capital, µE , was used from banks from the UK banking system. For θ = 0, banks
are not interconnected. In that case, for both years no systemic distress event
happens. In order for a system failure to happen, θ needs to be non-zero. The
sudden system failure happens for the banking system calibrated with the 2007
UK data for θ = 0.07 at which the banking system calibrated with 2012 UK data
is still in a stable state. For θ ≥ 0.10, the banking system calibrated with 2012 UK
data also becomes unstable for a large enough f . However, f at which the systemic
distress happens for the 2007 UK data is smaller then the value for f at which the
systemic failure happens when the banking system is calibrated with the 2012 UK
data implying that the 2007 system is more prone to failure then the 2012 banking
system.
visible for p for f around 0.5. The banking system calibrated with the 2012
data set remains stable for θ set to either 0.03 or 0.07. This changes when θ
is further increased. In the second row of Figure 11, θ is set to 0.10, 0.11 and
0.13. The sudden jump for banks calibrated with the 2007 data set happens
for f around 0.56 to 0.51 and increases even further in the third row when θ
takes the values 0.3, 0.4 and 0.5 with a value of f around 0.46 - 0.31 being
sufficient to ensure an unstable banking system. For the banking system
calibrated with the 2012 data set a jump also occurs for values of θ above
and including 0.1. For θ equal to 0.10 the jumps happens for f around 0.66.
As for the 2007 data set, the jump moves to a lower value of f for a larger θ
with θ set to 0.5, f being around 0.36 for the jump to happen.
For θ equal to 0.10 or 0.11 a jump occurs as well for the banking system
calibrated with the 2012 UK data set. However, after the jump, p increases
for increasing f . This can be explained using Figure 12. Figure 12 is the same
plot of the contour lines of surviving banks as plotted in Figure 4. The black
symbols indicate the position of p for fixed θ equal to 0.10 and varying f as
indicated in the accompanying legend. It becomes obvious that for increasing
f , b decreases such that for f = 0.90 a jump does not become possible any
more and the system is in the reversible region. At the same time, the value
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Fig. 12 The figure is similar to Figure 4 showing the fraction of surviving banks
for different values of a and b. Additionally to the fraction of surviving banks for
particular values of a and b, we also plotted the particular values of the fraction of
surviving banks calibrated with the 2012 UK data for θ fixed at 0.10 for varying
f as indicated. It becomes clear that for increasing f , b decreases such that for
f = 0.90, b becomes less than bc. Simultaneously, p increases explaining the increase
in p observed in Figure 11 for θ = 0.10 and θ = 0.11 for increasing f for the 2012
UK data.
of p increases for decreasing b. Hence, we can observe an increase in p even
so f and henceforth the uncertainty σ increases.
Figure 13 is similar to Figure 11 except that we used US banks to calibrate
the model with the blue crossed line representing the fraction of surviving
banks in 2007 and the black circled line being the fraction of surviving banks
in 2012. In Figure 13 the difference in the stability of the US banking system
in 2007 and 2012 is less visible suggesting that a shock of similar size as
happened in 2007 would also cause severe damage in 2012.
Figures 11 and 13 show that exposure to other banks played an important
role in the recent financial crisis. As we mentioned before we cannot be certain
about the actual average fraction of interbank loan nor the size of σ at that
time. However, an exposure of 30% of total assets to other banks seems like a
valid estimate. A σ of 25% or 50 % of the bank’s capital only happens during
a period of large uncertainty - which one can argue happened during the
2008 meltdown of the financial sector. In particular, the Financial Services
Authority (FSA) stated in their report on ”The failure of the Royal Bank of
Scotland” [24] that beside mismanagement a mismatch in short-term funding
and devaluation of long-term assets played part of the failure and eventual
bail-out of the Royal Bank of Scotland by the UK government. In the 2012
data set, for 30% interbank assets to total assets, σ needs to be much larger
for the jump to occur implying a more stable system. This is due to more
capital in the banking system. Needless to say that using the balance sheet
test to determine insolvency, a bank failure is always an option as capital
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Fig. 13 The figure is similar to Figure 13 except that US balance sheet data for
the years 2007 and 2009 was used to calibrate the model. The sub plots show the
fraction of surviving banks for the years 2007 (cross) and 2012 (circle) against
the fraction of σ to mean value of capital, f, for various values of the fraction of
interbank assets to total assets, θ. To calibrate the model, the mean of total assets,
µA, and the mean of Tier 1 capital, µE , was used from banks from the US banking
system. For θ = 0, banks are not interconnected. In that case, for both years no
systemic distress event happens. In fact even for an increased θ of 0.10 the system
is stable with only some losses for large f but no system-wide failure. The sudden
system failure happens for the banking system calibrated with the 2007 US data
for θ = 0.15. However, we note that for the same value of θ, the banking system
calibrated with 2012 US data is still in a stable state. For θ ≥ 0.17, the banking
system calibrated with 2012 UK data also becomes unstable for a large enough f .
For both years, σ needs to be at least half of the size of banks capital in order for
the system wide failure to happen.
is limited. The likelihood of such a large shock to happen is not part of
this paper but certainly it can be considered a rare event. Nonetheless, the
maximal economical feasible leverage ratio should be used as a minimum to
prevent entire system failure and taxpayer intervention.
7 Conclusions
We studied a stylized banking model based on balance sheet quantities to
understand the influence of counter party failure on the stability of the entire
banking system. In our stylized banking model, the number of bank failures
can be reduced by increasing the amount of lending in the interbank system
which can compensate for fluctuations in the assets and liabilities. However,
above a certain critical fraction of the average amount borrowed with respect
to the average combined fluctuations in liabilities and non-interbank assets
a single bank failure can trigger catastrophic events that can bring down
the entire system. In this regime, the system is irreversible and the normal
operating state can only be recovered at a cost of introducing capital exter-
nally. In addition to estimating the cost of rescuing a failed banking system,
we stated a minimum leverage requirement that ensures a stable system.
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We have archived this by solving a fixed point equation that reveals at the
transition two stable fixed points separated by a barrier in the form of an
unstable fixed point.
We archived this by constructing a Merton model of default where banks
interact with one another via interbank lending assigning banks a state
whether they are normally operating or are in distress. This allowed us to use
a stability analysis of the fixed points to investigate the stability of the bank-
ing system. The model uses balance sheet quantities to determine the counter
party risk of banks. The initial round of distressed is caused by changes in
the distributions of non-interbank assets and liabilities. We showed that de-
pending on the balance sheet parameters, non, partial, and entire failure due
to counter party risk of the banking system becomes possible.
We have verified numerically that this behavior is robust for different
kinds of distribution of assets and liabilities fluctuations and for different
types of interbank networks. We used simulations distributing assets and
liabilities randomly among banks varying the average capital and thereby
creating the initial round of default. The initial round of default created sub-
sequent defaults caused by reduction of the total assets due to distressed
counter parties. We showed that the predicted jump indeed occurs for differ-
ent distributions and various network structures.
Finally, we used balance sheet data of UK and US banks from the years
2007 and 2012 to demonstrate the stability of the banking systems in the
individual years. We showed that interbank lending made both the US and
UK systems more prone to failure in 2007 such that small fluctuations in
assets and liabilities could have caused catastrophic events. In 2012 for the
same fluctuations both banking systems are still stable with much larger
fluctuations needed to create a system-wide bank failure.
We would like to stress that the numbers evaluated with the model should
be taken with caution as the model is a simplification of real world events
- as any model always will be. Also by no means are we claiming that the
underlying distribution used to evaluate the stability of the model is a Stan-
dard Normal distribution or Student’s t distribution. However, it explains
the propagation of distress in a connected banking system and explains the
mechanism and conditions under which a system failure occurs. The simple
model of banking failure demonstrates the risk that counter party failure
imposes in a highly connected banking system and is an explanation as to
why the recent financial crisis had such a big impact even if it started with
a local shock in the US mortgage market.
An advantage of our model is, that interactions between variables can
be included. For example, we tested the effects of collateralized lending but
the impact of credit derivatives insuring against counter party risk could
also be included. Except of changing the underlying exposure matrix, we
did not explore the effects of heterogeneity of banks on the stability of the
system. The analysis of the network structure suggests that for banks of
similar size and exposed to similar market risk, the interbank network is
not important. However, real world interbank networks are structures such
that periphery banks are mostly small regional banks with core banks being
internationally operating banks. Clearly, the default of a regional bank will
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not have the same impact as the default of an internationally operating bank.
However, this effect is not covered in our homogeneous model. Similarly,
discussions about ring-fencing the banking system or using the Volcker rule
to separate investment and retail banking suggest that a shock to specific
asset classes might not be as severe to specific kind of banks as to others and
henceforth reduce the overall shock to the system. Changing the above model
to a heterogeneous system might give answers to some of these questions.
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